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ABSTRACT 
 
 
There has been a recent rejuvenation of interest in studies of motivation-cognition 
interactions arising from many different areas of psychology and neuroscience.  The 
current issue of Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience provides a sampling 
of some of the latest research from a number of these different areas.  In this introductory 
paper, we provide an overview of the current state of the field, in terms of key research 
developments and candidate neural mechanisms receiving focused investigation as 
potential sources of motivation-cognition interaction.  However, our primary goal is 
conceptual: to highlight the distinct perspectives taken by different research areas in 
terms of how motivation is defined, the relevant dimensions and dissociations that are 
emphasized, and the theoretical questions being targeted.  Together, these distinctions 
present both challenges and opportunities for efforts aiming towards a more unified and 
cross-disciplinary approach. We identify a set of pressing research questions calling out 
for this sort of cross-disciplinary approach, with the explicit goal of encouraging 
integrative and collaborative investigations directed towards them.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The construct of motivation has been a central part of psychology since the 
earliest days of James and Wundt.   It is a construct that spans many levels of analysis, 
complexity and scope, from cellular and systems neuroscience, to individual differences 
and social psychology (plus applied domains such as educational and 
industrial/organizational psychology, and clinical psychology and psychiatry).  Recently 
there has been a rejuvenation of interest in scientific studies of motivation, arising from 
three distinct scientific perspectives and research traditions: a) cognitive, systems, and 
computational neuroscience; b) social, affective and personality psychology, and c) 
aging, developmental, and lifespan research.   This special issue of CABN is the direct 
result of a recent effort to integrate and cross-fertilize these three research streams 
through a small-group conference sponsored by the National Institute of Aging (with 
additional support from the Scientific Research Network on Decision Neuroscience and 
Aging): Mechanisms of Motivation, Cognition, and Aging Interactions (MOMCAI). This 
special issue provides a sampling of the latest research that originates from these different 
traditions, with a number of the contributions coming from conference participants.   
In this introductory article, our goal is primarily conceptual: to define the space of 
the domain being covered in the Special Issue, as we currently see it.  Specifically, we 
highlight some key unresolved theoretical questions and challenges that need to be 
addressed by the field, while also highlighting what we believe are some of the most 
profitable research strategies.  Our hope is that this introductory article will serve as 
something like a road-map for researchers interested in getting involved with this 
research area. More importantly, we hope to stimulate cross-talk and the cross-
fertilization of ideas among investigators working in disparate research traditions.    
The paper is organized into five different sections. The first section briefly covers 
some of the recent developments that have rejuvenated the study of motivation-cognition 
interactions from different research perspectives.  In the second section, we discuss how 
motivation is defined and studied, with different emphases and foci, in each of these 
different traditions.   Third, we describe some of the relevant dimensions and distinctions 
within the domain of motivation, which help to further define and taxonomize this 
domain.   The fourth section focuses on candidate neural mechanisms, arising from 
cognitive neuroscience research, that are thought contribute to motivation-cognition 
interactions. In the final section, we highlight what in our view are some of the most 
pressing research questions and “low hanging fruit”, that we hope will be targeted in 
future investigations within this domain.   
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Recent research in cognitive, computational, and systems neuroscience has begun 
to uncover some of the underlying core mechanisms by which reward signals and 
motivational state changes modulate ongoing neurocognitive processing.  In particular, 
this work suggests that performing tasks in a context with available reward incentives 
leads to enhancements in specific cognitive processes, such as active maintenance in 
working memory, preparatory attention, episodic encoding, and decision-making 
(Hannah S. Locke & Braver, 2010; Maddox & Markman, 2010; Pessoa, 2009; Pessoa & 
Engelmann, 2010; Shohamy & Adcock, 2010). These cognitive effects appear to occur 
via modulation of specific neural circuits involving the prefrontal cortex (PFC), midbrain 
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dopamine system, and related subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia and 
hippocampus. The experimental work has been paralleled by theoretical developments 
involving the reinforcement learning computational framework.  This framework 
postulates that inputs coding the current and predicted motivational value of events are 
utilized by the brain as learning signals to adjust decision-making biases (K. C. Berridge, 
2007; Daw & Shohamy, 2008; S. M. McClure, Daw, & Montague, 2003; Niv, Daw, Joel, 
& Dayan, 2007).   
  A second stream of research development comes from the social, affective, and 
personality perspective. In this domain, investigations have focused on the types of goals 
that individuals select to pursue, and the internal and external influences on goal pursuit. 
In recent years, two surprising findings have emerged: 1) the explicit motivational value 
of behavioral goals is often not a strong determinant of whether those goals will be 
implemented and realized (Gollwitzer, 1999), because nonconscious influences can alter 
goal pursuit, primarily by modulating the perceived motivational value associated with 
goal outcomes (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001; R. Custers 
& Aarts, 2010); and 2) goal pursuit follows specific stages (e.g., planning vs. 
implementing) and time courses, such that goal directed behavior can increase, decreases 
or fluctuate over time, depending on the nature of the goal and the feedback received 
(Gollwitzer, 2012).   This work has spawned a host of experimental paradigms and 
research strategies for specifying and elucidating the nature of nonconscious effects on 
goal pursuit (Bargh & Morsella, 2010), effective strategies for emotional regulation and 
self-control (Kross & Ayduk, 2011), causes of self-regulatory persistence (Job, Walton, 
Bernecker, & Dweck, 2013), or  depletion and failure (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007), and 
major sources of personality differences (Sorrentino, 2013). 
 The role of motivation-cognition interactions has also been emphasized in recent 
aging and developmental research. On the aging side, a primary focus has been on 
motivational reprioritization among older adults (Charles, 2010; J. Heckhausen, Wrosch, 
& Schulz, 2010).  In the socioemotional domain, accumulating studies suggest that older 
adults can exhibit better emotion regulation than younger adults in some contexts, as well 
as a stable or increased focus towards positive affect (Carstensen et al., 2011; Mather, 
2012; Urry & Gross, 2010). Such findings are somewhat puzzling, given that emotion 
regulation is generally hypothesized to depend on executive control processes and 
supporting brain systems (e.g., prefrontal cortex) that are well-established as showing 
age-related decline (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Specifically, one theoretical account 
postulates that these effects reflect increased motivation towards emotionally meaningful 
goals and those associated with positive affect among older adults, as they get closer to 
the end of their life (Carstensen, 2006; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999).  
Contrasting accounts also focus on motivational reprioritization, but instead as a specific 
response to age-related cognitive decline. According to such accounts older adults will 
restrict cognitive engagement to: a) activities associated with maintenance or loss 
prevention as opposed to growth (Baltes, 1997); or (b) tasks with the greatest 
implications for self (Hess, in press).   
A different emphasis has arisen from the developmental perspective.  Here, the 
focus has been on potentially diverging trajectories in the maturation of cognitive vs. 
affective neural circuits. Specifically, adolescence has been highlighted as a period in 
which cognitive control processes are especially sensitive to incentive-related 
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motivational influences (Geier, Terwilliger, Teslovich, Velanova, & Luna, 2010; 
Prencipe et al., 2011; Somerville & Casey, 2010; Steinberg, 2010a; van den Bos, Cohen, 
Kahnt, & Crone, 2012; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010).  These trajectories also diverge 
again in older age, with cognitive prefrontal circuits more affected than emotional 
prefrontal circuits (Mather, 2012). 
Although the body of work examining motivational influences on basic cognition 
and higher-level goal pursuit is rapidly growing, there is often a lack of cross-talk 
between neurocognitively-focused researchers and those taking social/personality and 
life-span perspectives.  This is problematic because all of these perspectives are likely to 
be required to achieve a comprehensive understanding of how motivation impacts 
psychological and behavioral function.  A number of challenges must be overcome to 
enable such integration.   In the next two sections, we outline the key challenges of: a) 
defining motivation and b) specifying its relevant dimensions.  
 
MOTIVATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
A key challenge for cross-disciplinary integration is to establish a unified 
definition for motivation and how motivational consequences are operationalized in 
experimental investigations.  Indeed, different research traditions have emphasized 
distinct aspects of motivation.   Here we briefly discuss how motivation has been defined 
and operationalized from within these different traditions.   
 
Animal Learning / Systems Neuroscience.    
 Historically, studies of motivation in the animal learning tradition were strongly 
focused on homeostatic drive accounts, in which physiological deviations from an 
internal set-point led to shifts in motivational state (e.g., thirst, hunger) that trigger 
corrective behaviors (Bindra, 1974; Hull, 1943; Toates, 1986).  However, contemporary 
research has been strongly influenced by the discovery that variations in the magnitude 
and quality of a reinforcer or the outcome of an instrumental action have behavioral 
effects that parallel those induced by physiological shifts in motivational state.  This 
finding suggests that such states, rather than inducing drives, motivate behavior by 
modulating expectancies regarding the outcome (i.e., its incentive value).  Because the 
incentive value of an action outcome must be learned, much of current research focuses 
on the learning processes that mediate motivational control over behavior (K. C. 
Berridge, 2004). Incentive learning is investigated using standard Pavlovian and 
instrumental conditioning paradigms, and assessed in terms of the behavioral, 
physiological, and neural responses that develop to cue stimuli (CSs) previously 
associated with rewarding or aversive outcomes.   
In the domain of systems neuroscience, motivation is construed as having both 
activational and directional functions (Salamone & Correa, 2012), with the former 
related to the non-specific energization or invigoration of responding (typically assessed 
in terms of response rate or intensity), and the latter referring to specific response biases 
(typically assessed in terms of choice or place preferences).  Behavior is further 
considered to be under goal-directed motivational control if it meets two additional 
criteria: 1) it is sensitive to the current incentive value of the outcome; and 2) it is 
sensitive to action-outcome contingencies (Dickinson & Balleine, 1995). A canonical 
paradigm for investigating goal-directed motivational effects is the outcome revaluation 
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procedure (Dickinson, 1985), which is used to demonstrate how a change in the 
motivational state of the animal (selective satiation, physiological deprivation, aversive 
conditioning, etc.) can immediately impact Pavlovian responses (e.g., licking), and can 
also bias instrumental behaviors (e.g., rate of lever pressing) even in the absence of 
further contact with the reinforcer.  Studies are typically conducted with primary 
reinforcers, such as food, liquid, or sexual stimuli, used as incentives. 
       
Social, Affective, and Personality Psychology 
Social and personality psychologists use motivational constructs to describe why 
a person in a given situation selects one response over another or makes a given response 
with stronger intensity or frequency (Bargh, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2010).  This 
conceptualization follows that of animal learning and systems neuroscience studies, in 
focusing on both the activational and directional functions of motivation.  However, in 
the social, affective, and personality tradition, the primary interest is in how the direction 
and intensity of motivation arise from the expectations and needs of the individual 
(Weiner, 1992).   A key theoretical framework is the conceptualization of motivation in 
terms of goals.  Here, goals are considered to be mental representations of desired states, 
which serve as an intermediate construct that actually generates the activational and 
directional components of motivation (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; R. Custers & Aarts, 
2005; Elliot & Fryer, 2008).    Additionally, social and personality psychologists, use the 
term motive to refer to higher-order classes of incentives, such as achievement, power, 
affiliation, and intimacy, that may be intrinsically attractive to an individual (McClelland, 
1985b).  Motives can exhibit state-like properties, such that they reflect different 
situational construals, but there are also motive dispositions, which are relatively stable 
and trait-like (Gollwitzer, Barry, & Oettingen, 2011; Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2010).  
Gollwitzer (1990) coined the summary terms feasibility and desirability to 
describe the directional and activational determinants of motivation, respectively. 
Feasibility reflects expectations of the probability of attaining the desired future outcome, 
based on experiences in the past (Bandura, 1977; Mischel & Moore, 1973).  These 
expectations can specify whether or not: a) one is capable of performing a certain 
behavior that is necessary to achieve a desired outcome (i.e., self-efficacy expectations), 
(b) the performed behavior will lead to the desired outcome (i.e., outcome expectations), 
or (c) one will reach the desired outcome (general expectations; Oettingen & Mayer, 
2002). In contrast, desirability is defined as the estimated value of a specific future 
outcome (i.e., the perceived attractiveness of the expected short- and long-term 
consequences, within and outside the person, of having reached the desired future).  
  The dimension of desirability is often further subdivided in terms of motive 
strength and incentive value. Motive strength is defined primarily in terms of the 
individual, and relates to the class of incentives that the individual usually finds 
attractive. Thus, motive strength typically refers to the long-term likelihood that an 
individual will engage in actions of any type that would tend to satisfy the motive. In 
contrast, incentive value is defined in terms of properties of the stimulus, and specifies 
the behavioral choices made within a particular domain of action. As an example, high 
achievement motive strength will cause an individual to see challenging tasks as 
attractive and seek out opportunities to engage in them.  Tasks that provide the 
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opportunity for achievement pride will have high incentive value, and will be associated 
with specific behavioral choices that indicate high effort expenditure and task persistence.  
A typical experimental paradigm within social, affective, and personality 
psychology will examine the intensity or frequency of motivated behavioral responses in 
terms of these three factors (feasibility, motive, incentive value) (McClelland, 1985b). 
Response measures can be collected via laboratory performance tasks, but are also 
commonly acquired through self-report or experience sampling approaches.   Likewise, 
measures of motive, incentive value, and feasibility (expectancy) can be taken from 
personality questionnaires, implicit rating tasks (e.g., projective methods, such as the 
Thematic Apperception Test; Murray, 1943), or experimental manipulations of success 
likelihood. A canonical finding is the presence of a 3-way multiplicative interaction 
among these factors that predicts response strength (i.e., frequency or intensity of a given 
behavior) (McClelland, 1985a).   
  
Cognitive Neuroscience 
 In cognitive neuroscience, motivation is often formulated in terms of neural 
representations of expected outcomes that predict decisions regarding effort investment. 
Experimental investigations commonly operationalize motivation in terms of the transient 
neural responses evoked by extrinsic incentive cues.   These cues are used to signal 
parametrically manipulated rewards (typically monetary) available for instrumental 
actions, on the assumption that motive strength will covary quantitatively with reward 
amount. The Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task is a canonical paradigm for 
investigating such effects (Knutson, Fong, Adams, Varner, & Hommer, 2001): pre-trial 
cues indicate the amount of monetary reward to be earned (or penalty avoided) by 
making a sufficiently fast button-press response to a brief visual target, with the 
allowable response window typically manipulated to ensure a specific reward rate. This 
paradigm is used to identify cue-related activation in candidate motivation-linked brain 
regions (e.g. midbrain dopamine system, nucleus accumbens) that tracks the expected 
incentive value (i.e., amount x success probability) of the target action.  A limitation of 
these types of paradigms is that they do not directly indicate a motivational effect, 
because typical behavioral indices of effort investment – accuracy and reinforcement rate 
– are experimentally controlled (and even reaction time, which is not typically controlled, 
is almost never considered a dependent measure).  Instead, the expected value of an 
action is often treated as an assumed proxy for motivation in many cognitive 
neuroscience studies.  
Another approach that has been utilized to decouple effort investment from 
simple motor behaviors (e.g., response speed / vigor) is to examine how fluctuations in 
incentive value modulate engagement in effortful cognitive processing.  In this case, the 
motivation triggered by an incentive cue is related not only to the expected value of the 
action outcome, but also to the efficacy in obtaining it via a targeted neurocognitive 
process.  A canonical example of this approach is the Incentivized Encoding paradigm, in 
which pre-trial incentive cues indicate the incentive value associated with successful 
memorization of an upcoming visual stimulus, with payoffs delivered at a later memory 
test session (Adcock, Thangavel, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Knutson, & Gabrieli, 2006; 
Wittmann et al., 2005).  This paradigm has been used to demonstrate incentive-related 
mediation of successful memorization, in terms of the enhanced activation of motivation-
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linked neural circuits (e.g., dopaminergic pathways) and/or functional connectivity with 
memory systems (i.e., medial temporal lobe). Similar approaches have been used to target 
different cognitive processes, such as working memory, task-switching, attentional 
selection, response inhibition, and decision-making (Braem, Verguts, Roggeman, & 
Notebaert, 2012; Krebs, Boehler, Roberts, Song, & Woldorff, 2012; Krebs, Boehler, & 
Woldorff, 2010; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2012).  
 
Cognitive Aging & Development 
In cognitive aging research, motivational constructs have been invoked to explain 
changes in the selection of cognitive activities, level of engagement, and biases in 
attention and perceptual processing.   A common approach in this tradition is to assess 
cognitive task selection and engagement as a function of the motivational value 
associated with that task (e.g., Freund, 2006; Germain & Hess, 2007).  
A finding of particular interest within this domain is the positivity effect – in 
which memory and attention in older adults appears to be asymmetrically biased towards 
affectively positive items or events (i.e., age x valence interactions).  An influential 
hypothesis is that positivity biases are the result of chronically active emotion regulation 
goals; that is, a heightened motivation to focus on the positive and avoid the negative 
(Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Reed & Carstensen, 2012). A standard experimental 
approach for testing this hypothesis is to put emotion regulation goals in competition with 
other goals and compare their expression to unconstrained conditions. The assumption is 
that age-differences in active emotion regulation goals will be less strongly expressed 
when those goals are competing with experimentally-imposed task goals (e.g., 
remembering items for a subsequent memory test). This approach has been used to 
demonstrate that: a) larger positivity effects (age x valence interactions) are observed 
during unconstrained conditions relative to those that provide task-related goals (e.g., 
remember items for a subsequent memory test; Reed, Chan, & Mikels, 2014); and 
conversely, b)  positivity effects can emerge in younger adults instructed to focus on their 
emotions (Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004; Mather & Johnson, 2000).  Another 
experimental approach to the positivity effect is to focus on the role of cognitive control, 
under the assumption that control is required to maintain emotion regulation goals in an 
active and accessible state.  The key finding is that positivity effects are reduced in older 
adults with low cognitive control abilities, or under task conditions with high cognitive 
control demands (Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005; Petrican, Moscovitch, & 
Schimmack, 2008). However, it is important to note that to date, the influence of 
motivational variables (e.g. motive strength, incentive value) on positivity effects have 
not been assessed directly. 
Motivational constructs have also been invoked in the developmental literature as 
a primary means of explaining the apparent surge in risky decision-making that occurs 
during adolescence (Somerville & Casey, 2010; Spear, 2000). Both rodent (Douglas, 
Varlinskaya, & Spear, 2003) and human models (Cauffman et al., 2010; Steinberg et al., 
2008) suggest that reward-seeking, novelty-seeking, and exploratory behavior peaks in 
adolescence. These behaviors are interpreted in terms of the unique trajectories of brain 
development that occur during this age period, in which the key mechanisms that 
modulate dopamine circuitry function are maximally activated, leading to biased dynamic 
interactions within subcortical-cortical neural circuits. Specifically, these 
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neurodevelopmental changes are thought to up-regulate the signaling strength of 
motivationally salient information, such that it exerts a disproportionately strong 
influence over adolescents’ choices, actions, and regulatory capacity (Somerville & 
Casey, 2010; Spear, 2000; Steinberg, 2004; see Pressing Research Questions for further 
discussion). 
The standard experimental approach to this issue is to elicit motivational context-
specificity effects, involving the same types of incentive manipulations used in the 
cognitive neuroscience literature, to demonstrate that adolescents show adult-like 
decision-making under some circumstances, but selective disruptions under conditions in 
which salient affective-motivational cues or contexts are present (e.g,. Figner, Mackinlay, 
Wilkening, & Weber, 2009).   Current work aims to define the necessary and sufficient 
features of environmental cues and contexts that lead to heightened approach 
motivational behavior in adolescents. 
 
Summary 
 The preceding sections highlight the differences in how motivation is defined and 
investigated in various subfields. In animal behavioral neuroscience, the emphasis is on 
learning and conditioning processes, using primary incentives (food, liquid, sexual 
stimuli) and measuring simple behaviors (physiological reflexes, response rates, stimulus 
preferences).  In social and personality psychology, the emphasis is on the pursuit of 
temporally extended goals involving high-level incentives (power, achievement, 
affiliation), and assessing self-reported beliefs and goal striving behaviors. In cognitive 
neuroscience and adolescent developmental research, the emphasis is on neural 
representations of incentive value, typically using monetary rewards, and assessing how 
these modulate effortful cognitive processing.  Finally, in cognitive aging research, there 
is an emphasis on emotion-cognition interactions, using affectively-valenced stimuli, and 
measuring attentional and memory biases. 
This comparison across research domains reveals shortcomings within each 
subfield. For example, systems and computational neuroscience studies typically focus on 
very simple goal-directed behaviors, and thus have only rarely addressed why or how 
motivational factors can influence high-level cognitive processing.   In contrast, human 
cognitive neuroscience studies tend to use rather narrow experimental manipulations of 
motivational state (i.e., monetary reward incentives), and thus often fail to exploit the 
higher degree of experimental control that comes from using biologically-relevant 
incentives, such as food and liquids, that are more easily linked to motivational factors 
(e.g., physiological shifts, satiation, subjective preferences, etc.) (Galvan & McGlennen, 
2013; Krug & Braver, in press). Conversely, although social and personality 
psychologists more commonly explore the types of complex factors that are known to 
moderate human motivation (e.g., personality traits, affective context, situational 
construals), this work does not typically take advantage of the experimental precision and 
additional leverage afforded by the paradigms and methods employed in cognitive and 
neuroscience research (e.g., neuroimaging, pharmacological interventions, etc).   Finally, 
in cognitive aging and developmental studies, motivational mechanisms of age-related 
differences are often postulated without being explicitly tested with the types of 
experimental manipulations employed in either the neuroscience or social/personality 
literatures.  Greater cross-fertilization would be highly fruitful in helping each subfield 
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address its own limitations, by bridging between constructs and paradigms, such that 
motivation-cognition interactions can be understood at various levels of analysis.   
 
MOTIVATIONAL DIMENSIONS & DISTINCTIONS 
A second key challenge to cross-disciplinary integration is to identify the relevant 
dimensions by which to taxonomize motivational influences on behavior. As will become 
clear below, the motivational dimensions and distinctions that have been investigated and 
emphasized vary significantly across disciplinary subfields. As a consequence, 
researchers working in one subfield may not be aware of the distinctions prominent in 
another, and as such, may not be sufficiently informed and constrained by them in their 
own research investigations.  The goal of this section is to highlight these distinctions, 
and show how they challenge theory development and experimentation on the 
mechanisms of motivation-cognition interactions. 
 
 
Goal-directed Control versus Other Forms of Incentive-Based Learning 
Motivation is most often conceptualized as being goal-directed, in that effort is 
invested towards instrumental actions that bring about desirable outcomes, in relationship 
to the incentive value of those outcomes. However, through incentive-based learning 
mechanisms, stimulus-response (S-R) associations may also form that are independent of 
the current incentive value of a goal, as in the case of habits. Habits are important for 
behavioral control in that they enable efficient and automatized responding that does not 
require representation of action-outcome associations (Balleine & Killcross, 2006; 
Dickinson & Balleine, 2000). 
 Within the animal and systems neuroscience literature, considerable work has 
been devoted to distinguishing motivational effects on goal-directed versus habitual 
behavioral control. As described above, one classic approach is to identify goal-direct 
behaviors via outcome revaluation procedures, since habitual behaviors have been found 
to be insensitive to such manipulations (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994).  A second test is 
Pavlovian Instrumental Transfer (PIT; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994; Estes, 1943), in 
which presentation of a Pavlovian cue (i.e., predictive of reward not contingent on 
instrumental behavior) can enhance instrumental responding, although the cue had not 
previously been paired with such instrumental responses.  One form of PIT, termed 
general PIT, enhances instrumental responses even when they are not linked to the 
Pavlovian outcome (e.g., for a thirsty animal, a water-predicting cue can increase 
instrumental responding for a food reward; Dickinson & Dawson, 1987).  General PIT is 
thus activational rather directional, and appears to have a greater influence when behavior 
is under habitual control (Holland, 2004).  
 The phenomenon of PIT highlights the motivational effects of Pavlovian stimuli. 
Pavlovian motivational control has been referred to as incentive salience, which may be 
reflected in the subjective experience of ‘wanting’ (K. C. Berridge & Robinson, 1998).  
Incentive salience indexes the motivational power of learned Pavlovian CSs (i.e., those 
previously associated with appetitive or aversive outcomes) to invigorate behaviors. 
Incentive salience is wholly motivational, in that it is a function not only of the learned 
outcome value transferred to the CS, but also of the current physiological state (e.g., 
hunger, satiety, etc.).  Nevertheless, incentive salience is not thought to be goal-directed, 
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in the sense described above.  Indeed, Pavlovian responses appear to be hard-wired and 
reflexive, such that activated behaviors are somewhat inflexible, and may actually be 
maladaptive (Dayan, Niv, Seymour, & Daw, 2006; Hershberger, 1986).  A core feature of 
incentive salience is that the Pavlovian CSs can sometimes become “motivational 
magnets”, triggering approach (or avoidance) behaviors directed toward the cue itself 
(rather than the outcome they signify; K. C. Berridge & Robinson, 1998; K. C. Berridge, 
Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009).   
In recent years, there has been increasing mutual influence between systems 
neuroscience studies of animal learning and the computational framework of 
reinforcement learning. This framework formalizes learning algorithms by which agents 
maximize expected long-term reward (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Thus, reinforcement 
learning refers to learning the value of events, actions, and stimuli.  An important 
distinction in this literature has been between model-free versus model-based 
reinforcement learning, a computational distinction that parallels the habitual versus goal-
directed control distinction (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005). In model-free learning, action 
control is based on the learned (stored or “cached”) incentive values and behavioral 
responses that are associated with specific stimulus cues (eventually leading to habit 
formation).  In contrast, model-based learning involves a forward simulation in which the 
incentive value of an action is directly computed using a sequential transition model of its 
associated outcomes.  
Until recently, most reinforcement learning investigations have targeted the 
computational and neurobiological mechanisms that contribute to model-free processes 
(Doll, Simon, & Daw, 2012). One of the key reinforcement learning mechanisms that has 
been best studied is the reward prediction error (RPE), the primary signal that drives CS-
UCS learning from reward outcomes.  The RPE is now well-established to be encoded in 
the phasic activity of midbrain dopamine neurons and their mesocorticolimbic targets 
(i.e., ventral striatum) (Schultz & Dickinson, 2000).  However, the RPE may also reflect 
other forms of surprise signal triggered by salient, but not reward-predicting sensory cues 
(Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, & Hikosaka, 2010; D'Ardenne, Lohrenz, Bartley, & 
Montague, 2013; Dommett et al., 2005; Lammel, Lim, & Malenka, 2014; Redgrave, 
Gurney, & Reynolds, 2008). The relationship between the motivational and 
reinforcement learning functions of dopamine are still a matter of controversy, however 
(K. C. Berridge, 2012).  Most reinforcement learning accounts have neglected 
motivational variables (Dayan & Balleine, 2002); thus, the proposed RPE-type 
mechanisms that govern learning of CS+ reward values do not typically incorporate 
instantaneous effects of change in motivational state, or whether instrumental responding 
is goal-directed.   
 
Approach versus Avoidance Motivation 
A fundamental distinction within the domain of motivation is between whether 
the motive is to seek out and approach some object or activity, or instead whether the 
motive is avoidance, i.e., to escape from the object or activity.  The affective responses 
associated with these orientations differ, and the actions to which they relate also differ 
(Guitart-Masip et al., 2012).  The distinction between approach and avoidance motivation 
is one that must be dealt with cautiously, however. It tends to be assumed that positive 
affect is associated with approach and negative affect with avoidance, but that is not 
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always the case. There is a good deal of evidence that anger and irritability are related to 
thwarted approach rather than to threat motivation (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; 
Harmon-Jones, 2003).   
 The distinction between approach and avoidance motivation has been 
operationalized in diverse ways across the various subfields engaged in motivational 
research (Elliot, 2008). In animal and human neuroscience, the distinction is often made 
in terms of the brain systems involved.  For example, a classic distinction is between a 
mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic Behavioral Activation System (BAS) associated with 
approach motivation, and a Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS), originally localized to 
the septo-hippocampal system, associated with avoidance motivation (Gray, 1987). In 
contrast, for personality psychologists, approach and avoidance motivations are typically 
discussed in terms of stable individual differences in habitual orientations to the world, 
and assessed in terms of self-report scales (Carver, in press). These individual differences 
are typically discussed in the framework of reward sensitivity and threat sensitivity (e.g., 
BIS/BAS scales)(Carver & White, 1994), or in related self-regulatory dimensions, such 
as promotion (focus on advancement and accomplishment) versus prevention (focus on 
safety and security)(E. Tory Higgins, 1997).  
Activation of these systems is commonly elicited with different types of 
incentives, such as rewards versus punishments, or in humans, monetary gains versus 
losses.  However, this work also indicates more complexity than the intuitive valence-
based dimensions.   For example, in the cognitive literature, support has been found for a 
regulatory fit account, in which a promotion focus (either trait-related or an 
experimentally-induced state) will produce better performance when task incentives are 
framed in terms of monetary gain, rather than avoidance of monetary loss, whereas a 
prevention focus will show the opposite pattern (Maddox & Markman, 2010). 
In the human cognitive neuroscience literature, there is an ongoing debate about 
whether specific brain regions within motivational networks are valence- or affect- 
specific. For example, some human neuroimaging studies have found that nucleus 
accumbens activation is greater on trials incentivized by contingent gains relative to 
losses in the Monetary Incentive Delay task (Cooper & Knutson, 2008). In other studies, 
however, both the accumbens and the VTA respond during anticipation of both monetary 
losses and gains (Carter, Macinnes, Huettel, & Adcock, 2009; Choi, Padmala, Spechler, 
& Pessoa, 2013; Cooper & Knutson, 2008), and some studies report even greater 
responses under aversive than approach motivation (Niznikiewicz & Delgado, 2011). 
This result is paralleled by animal studies in which nucleus accumbens and ventral 
tegmental area have been found to reflect both appetitive (desire) and aversive (dread) 
motivation, although potentially in anatomically segregated subregions (Bromberg-
Martin et al., 2010; Lammel et al., 2012; S. M. Reynolds & Berridge, 2008; Roitman, 
Wheeler, & Carelli, 2005).   Similar complexities arise in regions often associated with 
aversive reinforcement learning, such as amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex 
(Hommer et al., 2003; Shackman et al., 2011), which also show responses to positive 
valence and involvement in appetitive learning.   
The lack of valence specificity in human studies using monetary incentives could 
reflect the fact that in such studies gains and losses do not present a true valence 
asymmetry. More specifically, unless participants are endowed on a prior visit and asked 
to pay back the experimenter, even if they lose on a given trial, they still leave the 
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experimental session with a net gain.   Likewise, loss of a positive incentive is not 
necessarily equivalent to those involving punishment.  The use of primary incentives 
alleviates this problem, but introduces others. One potentially promising approach has 
been to utilize selective patterns in the physiological activation of motivational systems 
as a reliable index of the meaning evoked by the objective incentives.  Such distributed 
patterns have been differentially elicited by task incentive structures; for example, in the 
Incentivized Encoding paradigm, shock threats  (aversive motivation) were associated 
with distinct patterns of activation and connectivity (amygdala / parahippocampal cortex) 
compared to those found for monetary rewards (approach motivation; VTA / 
hippocampus). These findings imply that engagement of distinct neural circuits impacts 
the types of memory traces formed under distinct motivational conditions (Murty, Labar, 
& Adcock, 2012), whether or not these differences are best accounted for by valence.   
   
Transient versus Sustained Motivation   
Animal and human neuroscience studies have typically investigated transient 
motivational effects associated with specific external cues.  Motivational influences are 
not just transitory, however, but can also persist in a tonic fashion across behavioral 
contexts. Recent findings have suggested the presence of sustained motivational effects, 
using incentive context paradigms (Jimura, Locke, & Braver, 2010).  Here, the incentive 
value of cognitive task performance is manipulated in a block-wise manner, but also 
more transiently via orthogonally manipulated trial-specific reward cues.  Incentive 
context has been found to be associated with enhanced task performance and sustained 
neural activity, but these effects were independent of trial-specific incentive value (Chiew 
& Braver, 2013; Jimura et al., 2010).  
Similarly, physiological investigations, chiefly focused on the dopamine system, 
have overwhelmingly focused on transient responses to discrete motivational cues, 
despite a wealth of pharmacological research in animals, healthy humans and patient 
populations that demonstrates a role for dopamine not just in processing and learning 
about discrete rewards, but also in motivation and sustained motivated behavior (K. C. 
Berridge, 2007; Salamone & Correa, 2012). Moreover, whereas the anatomy of 
dopaminergic synapses in the striatum suggests high temporal precision, dopaminergic 
effects on learning can potentially bridge multiple synapses and phasic events (Lisman, 
Grace, & Duzel, 2011). Dopaminergic synaptic anatomy outside the striatum in cortex 
and in the hippocampus includes significant distances between terminals and receptors, 
consistent with modulation over slower, sustained timescales (Shohamy & Adcock, 
2010). 
One theoretical account explains these sustained motivational effects in terms of 
incentive context-related changes in tonic dopamine (Niv et al., 2007).  According to this 
account, tonic dopamine signals the long-term average reward rate of the current 
environment.   This signal is thought to lead to a generalized increase in the vigor or 
intensity of action, by indicating an increased “opportunity cost” of response latency.    In 
other words, when the current environmental context has high incentive value, increasing 
the speed of all actions (even those not directly rewarded) will typically enable more 
rewards to be harvested per unit time. As such, sustained motivation may have 
connections with general PIT effects, which are also thought to produce a more non-
specific invigoration of behavioral responding (Niv et al., 2007). Interestingly, recent 
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evidence from microdialysis has demonstrated tonic dopamine efflux correlated with 
long-term average reward rates selectively in PFC terminal regions, but not the nucleus 
accumbens (St Onge, Ahn, Phillips, & Floresco, 2012).  Other work has shown tonic 
dopamine release, as well as sustained firing of dopamine neurons, under conditions 
related to anticipatory, sustained motivated behaviors (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; 
Howe, Tierney, Sandberg, Phillips, & Graybiel, 2013; Totah, Kim, & Moghaddam, 
2013).  These dopamine-mediated effects of sustained motivation now await 
demonstration in humans.   
 
 
Conscious versus Non-conscious Motivation   
Motivated behavior is often assumed to start with conscious awareness and the 
formation of explicit intentions.  However, as noted above, provocative findings over the 
last two decades, primarily from within the social and personality literature, have 
highlighted a distinction between conscious versus non-conscious motivation, and the 
presence of implicit (or non-conscious) goal-pursuit, in which motivated behavior is 
instigated by environmental cues that may not reach conscious awareness (R.  Custers, 
Eitam, & Bargh, 2012). This idea has led to a research focus that contrasts goal-pursuit 
under conditions in which goals are implicitly versus explicitly activated.  The typical 
methodological approach to implicit goal priming is the presentation of words, pictures, 
or other stimuli, either in seemingly unrelated tasks preceding the experimental task or by 
subliminal priming, both of which render conscious awareness of this influence less 
likely.  These priming manipulations both increase the tendency to engage in goal-
relevant action patterns and the vigor with which goal pursuit is executed (R. Custers & 
Aarts, 2010). 
 Recent studies have extended this approach to focus on implicit priming of reward 
cues to motivate cognitive performance. In these studies, the reward that can be earned on 
a particular trial is cued at its beginning, either clearly visible, or presented subliminally. 
Subliminally presented high reward cues have been found to induce more cognitive effort 
expenditure than low reward cues (Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2009; Capa, Bustin, 
Cleeremans, & Hansenne, 2011). A few cognitive neuroscience studies using 
subliminally presented reward cues have demonstrated that these engage subcortical 
motivation-linked brain regions, such as the ventral pallidum, in proportion to incentive 
value (Pessiglione et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2008). The cognitive performance effects 
of subliminal reward cues have been found to diverge in some instances from that of 
clearly visible reward cues, specifically under conditions in which visible rewards lead to 
a strategic change in behavior. For example, in some cases whereas subliminal reward 
cues only boost expenditure of effort, visible rewards lead to a speed-accuracy tradeoff 
(Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2010). Likewise, subliminal reward cues modulate cognitive 
performance even on trials in which rewards are known to be unattainable, whereas such 
effects are not present for clearly visible reward cues (Zedelius, Veling, & Aarts, 2012).   
If the effects of subliminal reward cues had been mediated by conscious processes (e.g., 
perceiving that the trial has high or low incentive value), such a divergence should be 
absent. Hence, it appears that reward cues can motivate behavior in the sense that the 
expenditure of effort is increased, even without people being aware of it (for further 
discussion see Bargh & Morsella, 2008). 
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Extrinsic versus Intrinsic Motivation 
Animal and human neuroscience studies have almost uniformly focused on 
extrinsic motivation, the neural and behavioral responses to extrinsically provided 
incentives (e.g., food, money, etc.).  However, in social and personality psychology, 
extrinsic motivation is strongly distinguished from various forms of intrinsic motivation.  
Intrinsic motivation is defined as engagement in a task for the inherent pleasure and 
satisfaction derived from the task itself (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Intrinsic motivation appears 
to drive behavior in a way that is different from, and potentially even in competition with 
extrinsic motivation. The most provocative example of this competition is the 
undermining effect (Deci, 1971; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Ryan, Mims, & Koestner, 
1983)(also called the "motivation crowding-out effect"; Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Frey 
& Jegen, 2001)(or "overjustification effect"; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973), a 
phenomenon in which people’s intrinsic motivation is decreased by receiving 
performance-contingent extrinsic rewards.  
The standard approach for demonstrating undermining effects on intrinsic 
motivation is through free-choice paradigms. Here, willingness to voluntarily engage in a 
target task is assessed after a preceding phase in which the targeted task is performed 
either under conditions in which performance-contingent extrinsic rewards are provided 
or not (manipulated across groups). A large number of studies have found that the 
extrinsic reward group spends significantly less time than the control group engaging in 
the target task during the free-choice period, providing evidence that the extrinsic 
rewards undermine intrinsic motivation for the task (Deci et al., 1999; Tang & Hall, 
1995; Wiersma, 1992). Although intrinsic motivation has been mostly neglected in 
cognitive and neuroscience studies, a recent study showed neural evidence of the 
undermining effect, in that removing performance-contingent extrinsic rewards led to 
reduced activity in reward motivation regions (anterior striatum, dopaminergic midbrain) 
during a subsequent unrewarded performance phase (when compared to a never rewarded 
control group) (Murayama, Matsumoto, Izuma, & Matsumoto, 2010).  Other recent 
studies using different paradigms, such as those involving interesting trivia questions 
(Kang et al., 2009), inherently pleasurable music (Salimpoor et al., 2013), and self-
determined choice (Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Murayama et al., in press),  also indicate that 
intrinsic motivation may be related to the modulation of reward circuitry (e.g., striatum).  
In the reinforcement learning literature there have also been recent attempts to expand the 
basic framework to incorporate computational mechanisms of intrinsic motivation 
(Oudeyer & Kaplan, 2007; Singh, Lewis, Barto, & Sorg, 2010). 
 
Goal-setting versus Goal-striving 
In social psychological treatments, the motivated pursuit of goals is often 
separated into goal-setting and goal-striving phases (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; 
Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001).  Goal setting refers to the processes and determinants of 
how a particular goal gets selected for pursuit, whereas goal striving indicates the 
processes by which a particular goal, once implemented, is used to modulate on-going 
behavior. Goal-setting research is aimed at demonstrating that goal selection can be 
influenced by various factors, such as how the goal is assigned (by self or other), framed 
(the goal content) and internally represented (the goal structure). Here the 
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approach/avoidance (or relatedly, promotion versus prevention) motivational distinction 
becomes especially relevant, in terms of both trait-related individual differences (what 
goals the individual finds desirable), as well situational context manipulations (to 
minimize failure or maximize success).    
Gollwitzer (1990) has suggested that whereas goal-setting can be characterized in 
terms of motivational principles, goal-striving is best characterized in terms of volitional 
factors.  These include action initiation, persistence, goal-shielding, feedback integration, 
and disengagement. Accordingly, goal-striving research primarily focuses on the kinds 
and effectiveness of self-regulatory strategies that are implemented to attain the goal. 
Surprisingly, increasing the strength of goal activation (intention) may sometimes 
produce only limited impacts on successful goal attainment (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). 
Instead, volitional self-regulatory strategies are needed to prepare for potential obstacles 
standing in the way of attaining the desired future, and to stay on track and pursue the 
desired future even in the face of difficulties and temptations.    
Two key self-regulatory strategies that are a focus of current investigation are 
mental contrasting and implementation intentions. Mental contrasting allows people to 
explicitly consider possible resistances and conflicts when trying to reach a desired future 
(Oettingen, 2012). Mental contrasting means mentally juxtaposing the desired future 
(e.g., completing a writing project) with obstacles of present reality (e.g., following an 
invitation to socialize). It is used to project success expectations, so that these can 
determine the intensity of goal pursuit.  Implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999; 
Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2011) are a strategy that involves generating “if…,then…” plans 
to link a critical situation with an action that is instrumental to reaching a desired future 
(e.g., if it is Saturday afternoon and my friends invite me to watch a movie, then I will tell 
them that I will first finish my writing project). These plans offer a short-cut to automated 
responding (i.e., creating ad-hoc habits). In other words, if-then plans allow people to 
perform automatized responses in the specified critical situation in a fast and effortless 
way and without any further conscious intent.  It is worth pointing out that the automated 
nature of implementation intentions suggests a potential similarity to habitual control as 
studied in the animal learning literature.  However, in implementation intentions, the 
resilience to shifting motivational states is created not by overlearned associations, but 
rather by the prospective decision to avoid outcome revaluation.   
The goal-setting and goal-striving phases can also be distinguished in terms of 
their differential “mindsets”, in that goal-setting is associated with a deliberative mindset, 
whereas goal-striving is associated with an implemental mindset (Gollwitzer, 2012).  The 
deliberative mindset is characterized by general attentional broadening and a cognitive 
focus on desirability and feasibility information, while the implemental mindset is 
characterized by strengthened goal representations, upwardly biased assessments of 
feasibility, and more general attentional narrowing.  One methodological approach used 
to investigate these mindsets and phases is to interrupt participants and have them engage 
in cognitive tasks while they are in the midst of deciding upon a goal to pursue 
(deliberative mindset), or immediately after they have chosen one (implemental mindset) 
(H. Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987).   
 
Positive versus Negative Feedback   
Feedback is thought to play a fundamental role in goal pursuit, by providing 
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individuals information on how to evaluate their commitment to goal-striving, in terms of 
whether, what, and how much to invest in their goals (A. Fishbach, Koo, & Finkelstein, 
2014). An important distinction has been postulated between the motivational 
consequences of positive (completed actions, strengths, correct responses) and negative 
feedback (remaining actions, weaknesses, and incorrect responses) (A.  Fishbach & Dhar, 
2005; A. Fishbach, Dhar, & Zhang, 2006; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996).  A key finding is that 
positive feedback increases motivation (and thus, goal pursuit) when it is used to evaluate 
commitment, by signaling that the goal is of high value and attainable.  In contrast, 
negative feedback increases motivation when it is used to evaluate progress: that more 
effort is needed to accomplish the goal (e.g., cybernetic models; Carver & Scheier, 1998; 
E. T. Higgins, 1987). Indeed, whereas positive feedback for successes can signal 
sufficient accomplishment, and “licenses” the individual to disengage with the goal 
(Monin & Miller, 2001), when people think of their goals in cybernetic terms (e.g., 
“closing a gap”), negative feedback is motivating.  
In general, positive feedback should be more effective than negative feedback 
when goal commitment is lower, because positive feedback increases commitment. 
Negative feedback, in contrast, will be more effective than positive feedback when goal 
commitment is already high, because it signals greater discrepancy (i.e., a larger gap to be 
closed).  A promising approach to investigate feedback effects has been to explore how 
they interact with goal commitment level to influence motivation.  For example, Koo and 
Fishbach (2008) manipulated feedback by emphasizing either completed or missing goal 
actions (e.g., positive feedback: “you have completed 50% of the work to date” versus 
negative feedback: “you have 50% of the work left to do”). When goal commitment level 
was low, positive feedback on completed actions increased motivation more than 
negative feedback.  Conversely, when goal commitment was high, the reverse pattern is 
obtained (greater increase in motivation with negative feedback).   It is interesting to note 
that this perspective on negative feedback as sometimes increasing motivation contrasts 
with the one typically adopted in the cognitive and neuroscience literatures, in which it is 
assumed that negative feedback will have an immediate impact in reducing reward value 
estimates. 
 
Summary 
As the above sections detail, the distinctions and dimensions investigated in 
studies of motivation vary greatly in terms of disciplinary focus. Some, like distinctions 
between phases of high-level goal-pursuit (e.g., goal-setting versus goal-striving) are 
studied almost exclusively from within one domain. Others, like the approach / avoidance 
distinction, have been studied from multiple perspectives. Yet even in such cases, 
important differences in emphases are present. For example, approach versus avoidance 
motivation is typically studied as a stable trait variable in the personality literature, but as 
a state manipulation in systems and cognitive neuroscience.  
There remain many important challenges for cross-disciplinary integration in the 
study of motivation-cognition interactions. Challenges arise even at the level of defining 
our terms: some concepts and phenomena do not currently extend across fields, and those 
that do sometimes have different usage or implications. Table 1 presents the differential 
representation and usage of key concepts across fields, including some examples of 
potential conflicts in usage. Our hope is that, as researchers become more aware of the 
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motivational dimensions and distinctions that are emphasized in other subfields, they will 
be inspired to initiate further cognitive neuroscience and cross-disciplinary investigations 
and bring these concepts into even closer alignment. The explorations into conscious 
versus unconscious (Pessiglione et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2008) and intrinsic versus 
extrinsic motivation (Murayama et al., 2010) beginning to occur from a cognitive 
neuroscience perspective offer promising examples of these efforts. 
 
MECHANISMS OF MOTIVATION-COGNITION INTERACTIONS 
 One of the challenges for cognitive, affective, and behavioral neuroscience 
research is to provide an account of motivation-cognition interaction in terms of the 
neural mechanisms that enable such interactions to occur. The key challenge is that 
although “motivation” and “cognition” are usefully specified as distinct psychological 
entities, it is not all clear that they have separable implementation in the brain. Indeed, the 
neural systems implicated in the internal representation of cognitive goals, and the active 
maintenance and manipulation of information in working memory (e.g., frontoparietal 
and frontostriatal circuits), bear a striking similarity to those implicated in the generation 
of motivated behaviors. Thus, mechanistic accounts of motivation-cognition interactions 
run the risk of drawing a false dichotomy, if they are couched in terms of a discrete point 
of interface between two distinct neural systems (Pessoa, 2013).   
 Despite this caveat, several neural candidate mechanisms have been described 
that enable shifts in motivational state to be transmitted into a form that can modulate 
cognitive processing (see Figure 1).  These candidates fall into several broad classes: 1) 
broadcast neuromodulation, influencing cellular-level physiologic response properties; 2) 
communication between large-scale brain networks, either via direct pathways or shifts in 
network topology; and 3) engagement of specific brain computational hubs that serve as 
integrative convergence zones.  All of these mechanisms implicate some form of 
neuromodulatory transmission. Of the brain neuromodulatory systems, the one most 
closely linked to motivation is dopamine.   We therefore first consider the regulation of 
dopamine release and its effects on its targets as a useful model mechanism for the 
transmission of motivational signals.  We then move on to discuss network and circuit 
interactions. Finally, we highlight specific computational hubs in the striatum, anterior 
cingulate cortex, and lateral PFC, that are thought to play increasingly well-understood 
roles in motivated cognition.  
 
Broadcast Neuromodulation: Dopamine (and other systems)  
Widespread projections enable neuromodulatory systems to reach large portions 
of the cortical surface and subcortical areas, from which they can rapidly influence 
neuronal activity.   The broadcast release of global neuromodulators, such as dopamine 
and norepinephrine, are thus likely to have complex rather than monotonic effects, that 
nevertheless may have synergistic actions at multiple levels of functioning.  Dopamine, in 
particular, is known to have a range of effects on cellular level physiology, including 
modulating synaptic learning signals (Calabresi, Picconi, Tozzi, & Di Filippo, 2007; 
Lisman et al., 2011; J. N. Reynolds & Wickens, 2002), altering neuronal excitability 
(Henze, Gonzalez-Burgos, Urban, Lewis, & Barrionuevo, 2000; Nicola, Surmeier, & 
Malenka, 2000), enhancing signal-to-noise ratio (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008; Thurley, 
Senn, & Luscher, 2008), and impacting the temporal patterning of neural activity 
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(Walters, Ruskin, Allers, & Bergstrom, 2000).  Such effects in subcortical and cortical 
targets (e.g., frontal cortex) could alter processing efficiency in a number of ways, such 
as by sharpening cortical tuning (Gamo & Arnsten, 2011), heightening perceptual 
sensitivity and discrimination (Pleger et al., 2009), enhancing attentional or cognitive 
control and working memory function (Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010), and enhancing 
targeted long-term memory encoding (Shohamy & Adcock, 2010).  
The dynamic changes in neurophysiology that result from release of the 
neuromodulators implicated in motivation are evident not only cellularly, but also at the 
circuit level. As one example, functional MRI evidence has shown that reward versus 
punishment-motivated learning reconfigures neural circuits, with marked consequences 
for the sensitivity of memory encoding systems (Adcock et al., 2006; Murty & Adcock, 
2013; Murty et al., 2012). These reconfigurations are evident both in systems thought to 
primarily implement motivation, and in the broader networks devoted to the memory 
encoding task. For example, during intentional encoding, learning under reward 
incentives increases connectivity and activation in the VTA and hippocampus, whereas 
learning under threat engages amygdala and parahippocampal cortex. The consequences 
of these differences in the neural implementation of memory encoding translate into 
qualitatively different memory traces, because hippocampal encoding embeds items in 
context to support more flexible representations, whereas parahippocampal encoding 
selectively emphasizes features of the scene. These findings imply that motivated states 
can influence the content and form of long-term memory formation, potentially tailoring 
the memory trace to support future behaviors consistent with that same motivational 
state.  
 
Network Interactions: Direct Communication and Topological Reconfiguration 
Interactions between motivation and cognition appear to rely on the 
communication between “task networks” (e.g., the dorsal frontoparietal network engaged 
during attention tasks) and “valuation networks,” which involve both subcortical regions, 
such as those in the striatum, and cortical ones, such as orbitofrontal cortex. These 
interactions are suggested to take place via multiple modes of communication.    The first 
mode involves direct pathways between task and valuation networks. One example is the 
pathway between orbitofrontal and lateral PFC (Barbas & Pandya, 1989). Another 
example involves the pathways between the extensively interconnected lateral surface of 
frontal cortex (including dorsolateral PFC) and cingulate regions (Morecraft & Tanji, 
2009). Finally, the caudate is connected with several regions of frontal cortex (including 
lateral sectors) and parietal cortex, in part via the thalamus (Alexander, DeLong, & 
Strick, 1986).  Thus direct pathways provide a substrate for cognitive-motivational 
interactions. 
A second mode of communication that might enable motivational modulation of 
cognitive processing is through a reconfiguration of network topology and structure.   
Network analysis provides useful tools from which to quantitatively characterize 
topological relationships within and between brain networks.  For example, in one recent 
study, Kinnison et al (2012) compared network properties and relationships in attentional 
and valuation networks during trials with low versus high reward value.   It was found 
that on control trials the two networks were relatively segregated (modular) and locally 
efficient (high within-network functional connectivity), but on high-reward trials 
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between-network connectivity increased, decreasing the decomposability of the two 
networks.  This finding suggests that a primary consequence of changes in reward 
motivational value is to increase the coupling and integration between motivational and 
cognitive brain networks. Such reconfigurations of network topology could potentially 
arise from neuromodulatory influences, as similar changes have been identified as a 
consequence of noradrenergic response to stressors (Hermans et al., 2011) and dopamine 
precursor depletion (Carbonell et al., 2014). 
 
Striatum:  Linking motivation to cognition and action 
Work with behaving experimental animals has long highlighted the importance of 
the striatum as a nexus mediating between motivation, cognition, and action (Baldo & 
Kelley, 2007; Belin, Jonkman, Dickinson, Robbins, & Everitt, 2009; Mogenson, Jones, & 
Yim, 1980). The nucleus accumbens in particular has been suggested as a key node, 
which may translate dopaminergic incentive value signals into a source of behavioral 
energization, drive, and the psychological experience of wanting (K. C. Berridge, 2003).    
This is consistent with animal data suggesting that the nucleus accumbens processes both 
the hedonic and motivational components of reward, within distinct subregions (S. M. 
Reynolds & Berridge, 2008). Likewise, neuroanatomical data from nonhuman primates 
have revealed an arrangement of spiraling connections between the midbrain and the 
striatum that seems perfectly suited to subserve a dopamine-mediated mechanism 
directing information flow from ventromedial to dorsomedial to dorsolateral regions of 
the striatum (Haber, Fudge, & McFarland, 2000).  In turn, an increasingly consensual 
view is that the reciprocal circuits between the striatum and frontal cortex function as a 
gating mechanism that prevents actions (and thoughts) from being released until the 
contextually and sequentially appropriate points in time (Mink, 1996; O'Reilly & Frank, 
2006). Taken together, these accounts suggest dopaminergic input to the striatum serves 
to mediate the interaction between motivation, cognition, and action.   
Accumulating evidence from genetic and neuroimaging (fMRI and dopamine 
PET) work with human volunteers and patients supports this hypothesis. For example, a 
recent dopamine PET study revealed that individual differences in baseline dopamine 
synthesis capacity in the dorsomedial striatum of healthy young volunteers predicted the 
effects of reward motivation on Stroop-like task performance (E. Aarts et al., 2014).   
Moreover, genetic differences in a dopamine transporter polymorphism were found to 
modulate the effects of reward on fMRI activation of the dorsomedial striatum (caudate 
nucleus) during conditions of high cognitive control demand (task-switching) (E. Aarts, 
van Holstein, & Cools, 2011). Likewise, it has been found that the ventral striatum 
exhibits common activation in tracking the effects of incentive value on both physical 
and mental effort exertion (Schmidt, Lebreton, Clery-Melin, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 
2012), and that its response to rewards is discounted as a function of the degree of effort 
exerted to obtain it (Botvinick, Huffstetler, & McGuire, 2009). These results further 
suggest that striatal dopamine might be a key mechanism in energizing both cognitive 
and motor behaviors based on their current motivational value.    
 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC): Computing the expected value of control 
Another key hub is a region of dorsomedial PFC that spans the pre-supplementary 
motor area and dorsal ACC.  The single-cell electrophysiology literature has suggested 
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that neurons in this region encode multiple aspects of reward, such as proximity to the 
reward within a behavioral sequence (Shidara & Richmond, 2002), the value of the on-
going task (Amiez, Joseph, & Procyk, 2006; Sallet et al., 2007), the temporal integration 
of reward history (Kennerley, Walton, Behrens, Buckley, & Rushworth, 2006), and the 
need to change response strategy (Shima & Tanji, 1998).   A general consensus view is 
that the ACC and adjacent dorsomedial PFC serve an evaluative role in monitoring and 
adjusting levels of control (Botvinick, 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Ridderinkhof, 
Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004; Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Shackman et al., 
2011), potentially in response to motivational variables (Kouneiher, Charron, & 
Koechlin, 2009).  
These ideas were recently formalized in an integrative account that suggests that 
the ACC might serve as a critical interface between motivation and executive function, 
by computing the “expected value of control” (Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013). 
Here, the imposition of top-down control in cognitive information processing is 
understood as both yielding potential rewards (for example, through enablement of 
context-appropriate responses) but also as carrying intrinsic subjective costs (Inzlicht, 
Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014a; Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; Kool, 
McGuire, Wang, & Botvinick, 2013; Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013; 
Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 2013). The decision as to whether executive resources 
should be invoked, favoring controlled over automatic processing, is based on a cost-
benefit analysis, weighing potential payoffs against their attendant costs (e.g., Kool & 
Botvinick, 2014). Based on a wide range of evidence, Shenhav and colleagues                             
(2013) proposed that the ACC might serve as a critical hub in the relevant cost-benefit 
calculations, serving to link cognitive control with incentives and other motivational 
variables.  
 
Lateral PFC: Integrating motivation with cognitive goal representations 
 A wealth of findings in both animal and human neuroscience studies suggest that 
the lateral PFC might serve as a convergence zone in which motivational and cognitive 
variables are integrated.  The integration of these signals reflects more than just additive 
contributions of cognitive demands and reward value, but actually enhances functional 
coding within PFC, such as by maximizing signal-to-noise ratio, enhancing 
discriminability of visuospatial signals, and increasing the amount of information 
transmitted by PFC neurons (Kobayashi, Lauwereyns, Koizumi, Sakagami, & Hikosaka, 
2002; Leon & Shadlen, 1999; Pessoa, 2013; Watanabe, 1996; Watanabe, Hikosaka, 
Sakagami, & Shirakawa, 2002). The dual mechanisms of control (DMC) framework 
suggests a specific mechanism by which these motivational influences on lateral PFC 
activity might modulate cognitive processing (Braver, 2012; Braver & Burgess, 2007; 
Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009).  
According to the DMC framework cognitive control can be accomplished either 
via a transient, stimulus-triggered, reactive mode or a tonic and anticipatory (i.e., 
contextually-triggered) proactive mode. Proactive control is the more effective mode 
because it enables pre-configuration of the cognitive system for expected task demands. 
However, it is thought to be metabolically or computational costly, because it depends 
upon the active representation and sustained maintenance of task goals in lateral PFC.   
Thus, it should be preferred under conditions involving reward maximization and/or 
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contexts with high motivational value.  Computationally, proactive control is thought to 
be achieved via dopaminergic inputs to lateral PFC, which enable both appropriate goal 
updating (via phasic dopamine signals) and stable maintenance (via tonic dopamine 
release) in accordance with current reward estimates (Braver & Cohen, 2000; O'Reilly, 
2006).   In contrast, the reactive mode, because it is transient and stimulus-triggered, may 
be less dopamine-dependent and may also involve a wider network of brain regions.    
Several studies have shown that pairing task contexts or trials with high reward 
value shifts performance towards proactive control, as indicated both by behavioral 
performance indicators and PFC activity dynamics (Braver, 2012; Chiew & Braver, 
2013; Jimura et al., 2010; H. S. Locke & Braver, 2008). Conversely, in non-rewarded 
contexts, lateral PFC activity has been found to reflect the subjective cost associated with 
exerting cognitive control (as estimated via both self-report and the tendency to avoid 
high control conditions; McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). Indeed, the robust findings of 
motivational influences on PFC activity and performance in tasks with high control 
demands suggests the possibility that proactive control shifts might be a primary 
mechanism by which the cognitive effects of motivation are mediated.   
 
Summary 
As the above sections indicate, there are a number of candidate neural 
mechanisms that have been proposed to mediate motivation-cognition interactions 
(Figure 1).   These range from more global and system-wide mechanisms, such as 
broadcast neuromodulation and network-level interactions, to the more focal 
computational hubs. The neuromodulatory effects of dopamine may serve as a unifying 
mechanism underlying motivational influences on neurocognitive processing across a 
range of levels.  Specifically, as previously described, dopamine has effects at the cellular 
level that are consistent with a range of motivation-cognition interactions (changing 
cortical excitability, signal-to-noise ratio, synaptic plasticity, etc). Likewise, dopamine 
serves a major input and neuromodulator of activation in each of the regions that have 
been identified as likely convergence hubs for integration of motivational and cognitive 
signals:  striatum, anterior cingulate cortex, lateral PFC.   Finally, more recent work has 
suggested that changes in dopamine tone can produce substantial effects on network-level 
dynamics and topology (e.g., Carbonell et al., 2014).   Thus, one important direction for 
future research will be to determine more rigorously whether these different levels of 
motivational neural mechanisms can indeed be unified in terms of dopamine 
neuromodulation.   
Nevertheless, it is critical to acknowledge that though most of the 
neuromodulatory-focused motivational research has targeted dopamine effects, the 
dopamine system has well-known and strong interactions with other neuromodulatory 
systems, such as acetylcholine, norepinephrine, serotonin, and adenosine. Thus, these 
other neuromodulators will need to be properly considered in order to form a complete 
picture of motivated cognition (Daw, Kakade, & Dayan, 2002; S. McClure, Gilzenrat, & 
Cohen, 2006; Salamone et al., 2009; Sarter, Gehring, & Kozak, 2006). Likewise, 
although we focused on the set of candidate hubs that have received the most attention in 
recent research, this set is clearly not exhaustive.  Indeed, other potential motivation-
cognition hubs have also been noted in the literature, such as the posterior cingulate 
cortex (Mohanty, Gitelman, Small, & Mesulam, 2008; Small et al., 2005) and anterior 
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insula (Mizuhiki, Richmond, & Shidara, 2012). 
Finally, it is clear that our understanding of the neural mechanisms of motivation-
cognition interaction will require not only better integration between levels of analysis 
(neuromodulation, regionally localized effects, network-level interactions), but also the 
development of neurocomputational frameworks that can accommodate these effects and 
better link them to cognitive and behavioral functioning.   Work in this area is just 
beginning, but one of the most promising directions may be to expand the reinforcement 
learning framework to incorporate motivational variables.   For example, initial attempts 
have been put forward to demonstrate the computational mechanisms by which 
motivation might modulate reward prediction error signals (Zhang, Berridge, Tindell, 
Smith, & Aldridge, 2009), simple model-free Pavlovian learning (Dayan & Balleine, 
2002), and generalized response vigor (Niv et al., 2007).  At a higher level, some 
accounts have utilized hierarchical extensions of reinforcement learning to begin to 
explain how reward and motivational signals might also be used to prioritize, select, and 
maintain temporally extended goals and more abstract action plans (Botvinick, 2012; 
Holroyd & Yeung, 2012).  Excitingly, these accounts have put forward initial sketches of 
the respective roles for the dopamine system, along with striatum, ACC, and lateral PFC 
in these processes.  Thus, more work in this area is clearly needed.  Indeed, one of the 
primary challenges will be to demonstrate whether such mechanisms and computational 
frameworks can be used to account for the various dimensions and distinctive 
components of motivational influence that were detailed in earlier sections.   
 
PRESSING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The previous sections highlighted some of the conceptual obstacles that challenge 
an integrative and cross-disciplinary investigation of motivation-cognition interactions, as 
well as some of the promising candidate neural mechanisms that are the focus of current 
research.   In this section, we discuss what we see are some of the current experimental 
and methodological challenges.  Specifically, we lay out a number of unresolved and 
puzzling issues that seem central to this domain, but which may represent potential “low-
hanging fruit” that are ripe for investigation.  Indeed, one of the goals of this section is to 
direct investigators towards these open questions, in the hopes of inspiring new research 
efforts targeted at them.   
 
Can motivation be dissociated from related constructs?  
 A concern that is commonly raised in studies of motivation-cognition interactions 
is whether effects attributed to motivational factors may actually reflect another related, 
but potentially distinct construct.   The most frequent candidates in this regard are affect, 
attention, arousal, and high-level decision-making strategies.  This important and 
longstanding issue has seen increased experimental focus in recent years, but targeted 
efforts are still needed.   Below, we describe work focused on each of these constructs in 
turn.  
The potential distinction between affect and motivation has been most directly 
addressed in the animal neuroscience literature, in terms of the distinction between the 
hedonic impact versus incentive value of rewards and punishments. The work of Berridge 
represents a major theoretical influence in this regard, employing pharmacological and 
lesion manipulations to demonstrate that ‘wanting’ can be dissociated from ‘liking’ (K. 
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C. Berridge et al., 2009).  The key methodological approach here is to assess the hedonic 
impact of food rewards during consumption via orofacial response patterns, while using 
Pavlovian and instrumental appetitive behaviors to assess incentive effects.   This has 
suggested that liking and wanting can be dissociated neurally in terms of anatomical 
substrates (e.g., distinct “hotspots” within the nucleus accumbens and ventral pallidum) 
and neurotransmitter modulation (GABA and dopamine) (Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009; 
S. M. Reynolds & Berridge, 2008).  
Similarly, a more recent stream of research within human cognitive neuroscience 
has addressed the dissociability of positive affect and reward motivation (Chiew & 
Braver, 2011).   Positive affect has been shown to have numerous influences on cognitive 
processing including enhanced creativity, broadened attentional focus, and greater 
cognitive flexibility (Carver, 2003; Easterbrook, 1959; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; 
Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987).  Here, the critical question is whether these influences  
can be dissociated neurally and behaviorally from the potentially overlapping effects of 
reward motivation.  Such overlap could occur because the receipt of motivating rewards 
has positive affective consequences, or because positive affect induces approach 
motivated behaviors. These types of overlap present considerable methodological 
challenges. One approach has been to operationalize reward motivation in terms of 
performance-contingent rewards, while positive affect is operationalized in terms of 
either randomly delivered rewards or incidental, positively-valenced stimuli (Braem et 
al., 2013; Chiew & Braver, 2011; Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012).  Another approach has 
been to induce affect that varies in motivational intensity, based on the theoretical 
assumption that high motivational intensity, whether for positive or negative affect, 
produces attentional narrowing, while low motivational intensity induces attentional 
broadening (Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Price, 2013).  Supportive evidence has been found 
with different kinds of stimuli used to induce high versus low intensity positive affect 
(e.g., desire: delicious desserts; amusement: humorous cats) (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 
2008).   
The conceptual similarity between attention and motivation has also been 
frequently noted (Maunsell, 2004; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). The term attention is 
often used similarly to motivation, in describing how processing resources are allocated, 
how they can be captured by salient stimulus cues, and how they are influenced by 
behavioral goals and expectations. However, there are points of conceptual dissociation: 
motivation is primarily related to the representation of incentive value and the 
energization of instrumental behaviors, while attention is primarily concerned with 
mechanisms of perceptual and response selection.  A common methodological approach 
has been to orthogonally manipulate attentional and motivational factors within the same 
experimental design (Geier et al., 2010; Krebs et al., 2012).  In terms of the neural 
mechanisms of attention and motivation, Pessoa and Engelmann (2010) detail a number 
of possible different scenarios: a) full independence, via distinct neural pathways; b) 
mediation, in which at least part of motivational influence is mediated by changes in 
attentional processes and neural systems; and c) integration, in which there is tight 
coupling between motivational and attentional brain systems, either in terms of 
convergence zones (hubs) or via network-wide interactions.     
 The relationship of motivation to arousal has been less well studied, particularly 
since arousal is a construct that is often under-specified experimentally.  Nevertheless, 
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arousal may imply the energization or invigoration of cognitive processing and behavior; 
this is also a central component of motivation.   Traditionally, arousal has been identified 
with the locus coeruleus – norepinephrine (LC-NE) system (C. W. Berridge & 
Waterhouse, 2003), while motivational signaling has been conceptualized in terms of 
dopamine activity (Wise & Rompre, 1989).  The relationships between these two 
neuromodulatory systems, and arousal and motivation more generally, have not been 
systematically investigated in cognitive neuroscience research. Methodologically, it 
seems possible to manipulate arousal independently of motivation (e.g., via 
pharmacological challenge, physical exertion, sleep-wake cycle, stress, etc.), which 
should enable a targeted examination of the relationship between the two constructs.  
A final issue concerns the role of motivation versus high-level decision-making 
strategies in modulating task performance.  This concern relates to the fact that 
manipulations of performance incentives have been a staple of cognitive research for 
decades, and have been traditionally used to modulate high-level cognitive strategies 
(e.g., response bias in signal detection experiments; Green & Swets, 1966).   Yet such 
work is usually not construed in terms of motivation, but rather in decision theoretic 
terms related to strategic performance optimization. Thus, it has been questioned whether 
it is necessary or even relevant to appeal to volitional and motivational factors when 
describing such effects.   There are a variety of methodological approaches that can be 
used to address this issue, such as: use of symbolic versus real incentives (Hubner & 
Schlosser, 2010; Krug & Braver, in press), identification of idiosyncratic effects of 
subjective reward preference (O'Doherty, Buchanan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006), 
exploiting stable individual differences related to reward and punishment sensitivity 
(Engelmann, Damaraju, Padmala, & Pessoa, 2009; Jimura et al., 2010), leveraging 
differential developmental trajectories of deliberative versus affective-motivational 
processes (Somerville, Hare, & Casey, 2011), and examining implicit or subliminal rather 
than explicit incentive cues (Bijleveld et al., 2009; Pessiglione et al., 2007).  All of these 
approaches tend to support the attribution of incentive effects on behavior and brain 
activity to motivational, rather than strategic factors.   
 
Why does motivation sometimes impair cognitive performance?  
In folk psychological terms, being motivated implies being goal-driven. 
Accordingly, motivation is commonly assumed to have only beneficial and monotonic 
influences on goal-pursuit. In line with this intuition, reward motivation often produces a 
general enhancing effect on cognition. However, motivation does not always improve 
and may in fact impair task performance in a variety of conditions (Bonner, Hastie, 
Sprinkle, & Young, 2000; Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). For 
example, the “choking under pressure” phenomenon has been coined to describe 
instances in which cognitive performance falters when motivational salience is high 
(Baumeister & Showers, 1986; Beilock, 2010; Callan & Schweighofer, 2008; Mobbs et 
al., 2009).  The affective, motivational, and cognitive factors that elicit such phenomenon 
are still not well-understood.   
One account of choking phenomena is that they stem from increased and 
distracting anxiety (Callan & Schweighofer, 2008), occurring especially in high-stakes 
situations (e.g.,  evaluative tests).  Both state and trait anxiety effects have been 
implicated in processes of over-arousal (i.e., U-shaped curve effects; Yerkes & Dodson, 
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1908) or diversion of attention and working memory towards the source of anxiety (e.g., 
threat monitoring; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). It is still not clear how 
to predict the motivational or cognitive factors that will elicit these anxiety-type effects. 
However, recent work using skin conductance as a marker of physiological arousal has 
found evidence of processes consistent with a noradrenergic contribution to such 
paradoxical incentive effects (Murty, LaBar, Hamilton, & Adcock, 2011).  
A second account suggests that motivation can produce impairing effects directly, 
even without elicitation of anxiety or over-arousal, simply by heightened activation in 
motivational brain circuits (Mobbs et al., 2009; Padmala & Pessoa, 2010), and possibly 
supraoptimal levels of dopamine (E. Aarts et al., 2014). One version holds that high 
motivation shifts the balance of influence towards an impulsive limbic reward system 
myopically focused on immediate rewards, and away from a more prospectively-oriented 
prefrontal cortical system oriented towards maximizing long-run gains (Loewenstein, 
Rick, & Cohen, 2008; S. M. McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). Another 
version focuses more directly on interactions between striatal and cortical dopaminergic 
systems, and, in particular, that dopamine has contrasting effects on cognitive control 
depending on current task demands, associated neural systems and baseline levels of 
dopamine in these neural systems (Cools & D'Esposito, 2011; Cools & Robbins, 2004). 
Accordingly, incentive motivation should enhance processes associated with cognitive 
flexibility (e.g., task-switching) via striatal dopamine effects, but can also, as a 
consequence, produce impairments associated with increased distractibility and reduced 
cognitive focus (E. Aarts et al., 2011). However, the fit of this account to experimental 
findings is somewhat mixed, indicating that further theoretical and experimental work is 
needed to provide a more comprehensive understanding of motivational impairment 
effects.  
For example, a related, but distinct account is that of regulatory fit (Maddox & 
Markman, 2010), which suggests that motivational effects on performance depend upon 
the interaction of three factors: a) whether approach or avoidance motivation is activated 
(promotion or prevention focus); b) the incentive structure of the task (gains or loss 
related); and c) the cognitive processes that are required to optimize task performance.   
Specifically, under conditions in which the current regulatory focus matches the task 
incentive structure (i.e., promotion focus with gain incentives, or prevention focus with 
loss incentives), processes associated with cognitive flexibility should be enhanced. In 
contrast, if there is a regulatory mismatch, task performance can be impaired, particularly 
when successful performance demands high cognitive flexibility.  In one supportive study 
testing this account, choking effects were observed when participants were put under 
high performance pressure (prevention focus) with a gain incentive structure (i.e., a 
regulatory mismatch), but only when the classification learning task relied upon flexible 
application of categorization rules (Worthy, Markman, & Maddox, 2009). 
 
How does motivation modulate cognitive effort?  
 As described previously, a primary account of motivation-cognition interactions is 
that motivation not only influences performance in cognitively effortful activities, but 
also the willingness to engage in them in the first place.   Indeed, some accounts suggest 
that the enhanced cognitive performance may actually result from selection of more 
effortful strategies, assuming that more effortful cognitive strategies are more effective 
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(e.g., proactive control; Braver, 2012). A role for motivation in the selection of effortful 
strategies is often neglected since strategy selection is typically considered in strict 
decision-theoretic terms of performance optimization. And yet, recent work has 
confirmed that participants will avoid cognitively effortful tasks, all else being equal 
(Botvinick, 2007; Kool et al., 2010). Thus, selection of effortful cognitive strategies 
should depend on cost-benefit considerations, weighing the incentive benefits of 
increased performance against the apparent cost of effort. 
Several state and trait factors may influence the subjective cost of cognitive effort. 
In the personality literature, it is well-established that there are stable trait-like 
differences in individuals’ “need for cognition”, which refers to preferences for effortful 
cognitive activities (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). More recently, 
experimental paradigms have been developed that enable direct assessment of avoidance 
rates for cognitive tasks (Botvinick, 2007; Kool et al., 2010).  Related paradigms directly 
estimate the subjective value of cognitive effort in terms of an economic decision 
(Westbrook et al., 2013): what additional amount of monetary reward will an individual 
trade away to avoid a high working memory load task in favor of a matched task with 
lower load?  Individuals high in need-for-cognition were found to trade away less reward 
than those low in need-for-cognition.  Additionally, state factors also moderate these 
effects, as they became stronger when working memory loads increased, but were 
proportionally smaller when incentive magnitude increased.  Such results are consistent 
with the idea that motivational incentives can influence willingness to expend cognitive 
effort, yet there is no direct evidence yet that these effects mediate strategy selection 
within a particular cognitive task.   
 There are a number of possible mechanisms by which motivational value could 
interact with cognitive effort.  First, motivation might modulate the computation and 
estimation of effort costs.  For example, motivational incentives have been shown to 
affect the rate of accumulation of a physical effort cost signal, arising in the anterior 
insula, which predicts decisions about when to rest (Meyniel, Sergent, Rigoux, 
Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2013). Another proposal postulates that effort cost 
computations and effort-reward functions are directly mediated by dopaminergic 
mechanisms (Phillips, Walton, & Jhou, 2007).  There is support for this idea from the 
animal literature, but only for physical effort (Breton, Mullett, Conover, & Shizgal, 2013; 
Salamone & Correa, 2012).   
A related possibility is that reward motivation might decrease effort costs. This 
decreased effort cost could occur directly, via dopaminergic broadcast effects. As 
described above, these could increase the fluency of cognitive processing via a variety of 
mechanisms (e.g., enhanced signal-to-noise ratio, sharpened cortical tuning, altered 
neuronal excitability, heightened perceptual sensitivity).  Motivation could also decrease 
effort costs indirectly, by increasing cognitive control, and thus the ability to successfully 
meet increased effort demands. Such an account would be consistent with proposed 
mechanisms of motivation-cognition interactions that postulate effects on how and when 
cognitive control is allocated (e.g., proactive control, expected value of control). This tpe 
of account also aligns with the influential ego depletion literature in social psychology 
(Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007), which assumes that exertion of control depletes a 
limited resource (but see Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014b; Kurzban et al., 2013), 
and that motivation compensates for depletion by decreasing people’s tendency to 
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conserve willpower (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). Likewise, as discussed further below, 
it is also consistent with the finding that people’s beliefs about the reward value of 
cognitive effort have a strong influence on their willingness to engage in it (Blackwell, 
Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Dweck, 2012). 
A final possibility is that the motivational effects on effortful cognitive 
engagement occur through a primarily affective route.  For example, it is intuitive to 
think that increasing incentive motivation changes the affective valence of cognitive 
effort from primarily aversive to primarily rewarding. Indeed, accounts of this flavor 
have been put forward in the animal learning literature to explain the effects of 
reinforcing high effort behaviors in the development of “work ethic” (Clement, Feltus, 
Kaiser, & Zentall, 2000) or “learned industriousness” (Eisenberger, 1992).  A similar 
type of interpretation is present in accounts from the social-personality literature that 
assume bi-directional affective-motivational interactions, such that making a cognitive 
goal a desired outcome increases the positive affect associated with it, and vice versa (H. 
Aarts, Custers, & Veltkamp, 2008). Such effects would be particularly relevant for 
studies investigating how to enhance cognitive engagement in relatively hypo-
dopaminergic populations (e.g., healthy aging) and clinical syndromes (e.g., anergia, 
anhedonia).  
 
How do motivation-cognition interactions change across the lifespan?  
 Development. A primary goal of neurodevelopmental research is to specify the 
biological mechanisms that dynamically influence behavior from childhood to adulthood.  
The adolescent period is especially interesting, in that some aspects of the brain have 
reached adult-level structure and connectivity, whereas others, including the prefrontal 
cortex, show developmentally-lagged trajectories, not reaching adult volume and 
connectivity until the late twenties. Lagged development of the prefrontal cortex has been 
implicated in the still-maturing capacity for adolescents to instantiate impulse control and 
other forms of self-regulation (Casey, Galvan, & Hare, 2005; Rubia et al., 2006). In 
contrast, critical components of dopaminergic neurocircuitry, including the ventral 
striatum and orbitofrontal cortex, are functionally sensitized during adolescence 
(Andersen, Dumont, & Teicher, 1997; Brenhouse, Sonntag, & Andersen, 2008). 
Likewise, fMRI studies demonstrate that the adolescent striatum shows a greater 
magnitude of response to reward cues relative to both children and adults (Galvan et al., 
2006; Somerville et al., 2011), and shows exaggerated prediction error learning signals 
(Cohen et al., 2010).  
 As such, the adolescent brain is thought to be in a unique state of heightened 
incentive salience signaling, paired with an underdeveloped capacity for impulse control 
(Somerville & Casey, 2010; Steinberg, 2010b). This combination is thought to represent 
a developmentally normative ‘imbalance’ that could lead to a heightened influence of 
motivational cues on adolescents’ behavior and decisions. Indeed, studies probing 
dynamic interactions within striatocortical circuitry demonstrate adolescent-specific 
patterns of neural reactivity and heightened functional connectivity that parallels a 
reduced capacity to withhold behavioral responses to appetitive cues (Somerville et al., 
2011). Evolutionarily-inspired accounts argue that the adolescent brain might exist in 
such a state of bias in order to facilitate exploratory behavior to leave safety in search of 
mates and resources (Spear, 2000).  
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Despite initial support for this framework, numerous fundamental questions 
remain. While a growing number of studies measure incentive salience responding or 
cognitive control across development, only a few have manipulated both processes within 
the same experimental design.  Thus, there is still a poor understanding of how dynamic 
striatocortical interactions and connectivity might shape selective shifts in adolescent 
cognitive behavior. In addition, it is unclear how particular contextual factors that 
influence adolescent motivated and risky behavior in the real world (such as the presence 
of peers or affectively arousing contexts) dynamically modulate striatocortical 
interactions and ultimately, motivated behavior during this complex phase of the lifespan. 
 
 Aging. Much cognitive aging research is focused on identifying the nature of age-
related change in specific cognitive processes, as well as understanding the underlying 
neural mechanisms. Although cognitive and neurobiological factors, such as processing 
speed, working memory, or gray matter volume may be predictive, they clearly do not 
explain all the age-related variance in performance (for review, see Allaire, 2012). 
Motivation-based accounts are also being increasingly emphasized as relevant for 
determining age differences in cognitive performance.  
 Age-related motivational influences may be evident in response to changes in the 
costs of engaging in cognitive activity. Hess and colleagues (Hess, in press; Hess & 
Emery, 2012) have argued that such costs increase in later life, and may negatively 
impact the motivation to engage cognitive resources in support of performance. Resultant 
shifts in the costs relative to benefits of engaging in particular activities are hypothesized 
to result in both reduced overall levels of participation in cognitively demanding 
activities, and in increased salience of the self-relevance of the task in determining 
engagement.  Some support for this selective engagement account has been observed 
experimentally in terms of self-report, physiological, and behavioral indicators regarding 
the costs of cognitive activity (e.g., Ennis, Hess, & Smith, 2013; Westbrook et al., 2013), 
as well as with self-reported shifts from a more extrinsic to more intrinsic motivational 
focus in later life (Hess, Emery, & Neupert, 2012). These findings lead to the interesting 
suggestion that some of the age-related variance observed on such tasks may reflect 
motivational influences, and that the observed age effects may overestimate age 
differences in underlying ability.   However, it will be important for further research to be 
able to disentangle and quantitatively estimate the distinct contributions of motivational 
and cognitive performance effects on age differences in behavioral performance.   
 As described above, motivational accounts have also been put forward to describe 
the positivity effect in cognitive aging. One tool for exploring whether such effects reflect 
a shift in motivational goals is to use eye-tracking, so as to provide real-time measures of 
visual attention.   These have resulted in fairly clear evidence that older adults look less at 
negative and more at positive stimuli than their younger counterparts (see, for example, 
(see, for example, Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006)). These age 
differences are magnified when participants come to the task in a bad mood (Isaacowitz, 
Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 2008).  But do these effects reflect motivation?  Positive 
looking behaviors could conceivably arise for motivational reasons (i.e., due to age-
related prioritization of emotional goals). However, direct evidence for a motivational 
explanation of these findings at this point is lacking. It may be that these effects result 
from age-related changes in goals, but that remains to be tested empirically. Thus, it 
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remains an open question as to whether age differences in looking and looking-feeling 
links really arise from age differences in motivation, and if they do, what specific 
configuration of goals lead to these patterns. To determine this, studies are needed that 
directly assess goals and track individual differences in goal states through looking 
patterns and mood changes, as well as studies that manipulate goals and put goals in 
competition to determine effects on looking and mood across different age groups. 
In general, theories of cognitive aging are strongly based in descriptions of 
neurobiological change, whereas none of the current motivational theories of aging 
integrate neurobiology. One account interprets the age-related positivity effect described 
above in terms of a potential re-tuning of amygdala sensitivity from a negative emotional 
bias in young adulthood toward a relatively more positive emotional bias in older age 
(Mather et al., 2004) as argued by the “aging-brain” hypothesis (Cacioppo, Bernston, 
Bechara, Tranel, & Hawkley, 2011; for an opposing view see Nashiro, Sakaki, & Mather, 
2012). Similarly, there is evidence for intact reward motivation and enhancement of 
positive anticipation relative to negative anticipation in older adults’ self-reported 
emotional ratings and neural activation in the striatum and anterior insula (Samanez-
Larkin et al., 2007). In contrast, a large literature suggests that many of the brain systems 
implicated in motivational enhancement of cognition decline structurally and functionally 
with age. For example, there is relatively linear decline in D1-like and D2-like dopamine 
receptors and dopamine transporters across adulthood (and mixed evidence for age 
differences in synthesis capacity; Backman, Nyberg, Lindenberger, Li, & Farde, 2006). 
Some have argued that differential age-related decline of specific neural systems may 
account for divergent trajectories of motivational and cognitive functions (e.g., 
MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002), but there is much debate about these theories, 
and they are not well supported by larger, cross-sectional and longitudinal studies of 
brain aging (Driscoll et al., 2009; Raz, Ghisletta, Rodrigue, Kennedy, & Lindenberger, 
2010; Walhovd et al., 2011). All of this is further complicated by a wave of recent, 
seemingly contradictory findings on age differences in sensitivity to positive and negative 
information in reward-based tasks (e.g., Eppinger, Schuck, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2013; 
Frank & Kong, 2008; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007). Thus, there is an urgent need for 
development of testable neurobiologically-based models of age differences in motivation 
and cognition.  
 
How do motivational incentives get translated into goals?  
Traditional theories (e.g., (e.g., Ajzen, 1991)) assume that high perceived 
feasibility and desirability of an imagined future outcome will always result in a strong 
intention (i.e., a goal) to reach this outcome.  Under such condition, the desired outcome 
(or incentive) is likely to transform into a goal. Extensive research has revealed, however, 
that even when the perceived feasibility of an attractive future outcome (i.e., a positive 
incentive) is high, people do not always commit to striving for it (e.g., imagine the highly 
attractive and feasible future outcome of becoming a skilled piano player).  Thus, a key 
question remains regarding what factors are critical to ensuring that a highly motivating 
outcome translates into a change in cognitive goals.   
Social psychological research has suggested important roles for both mental 
contrasting and mindset theory in the translation of an incentivized outcome into a goal 
commitment, even given high feasibility.  Mental contrasting is a process of simulating 
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both the desired future outcome as well as potential obstacles.  This process is thought to 
activate expectations of overcoming the obstacles: if expectations are high, people will 
actively pursue (commit to and strive for) reaching the desired future, but if they are low  
then people will refrain from goal pursuit, either reducing efforts or curbing them 
altogether  (Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001).   
According to mindset theory (Gollwitzer, 1990; 2012; also known as the 
"Rubicon Model"), goal-setting is the process of transition from a pre-decisional 
deliberative phase into the post-decisional implementation phase.  In the pre-decisional 
phase, the desirability and feasibility of a wish need to be fully and completely 
deliberated before the person can move from indecisiveness to decisiveness. Accordingly, 
when people feel that they have deliberated enough, they feel justified to move (i.e., 
“cross the Rubicon”) into implementation. Indeed, Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, and 
Ratajczak (1990) observed that as yet undecided people were more likely to make a 
decision after they had been asked to list likely positive and negative, short-term and 
long-term consequences of goal attainment.   
Although these accounts of goal-setting may apply well to the types of abstract, 
higher-order, and temporally-extended outcomes that are typically studied in social and 
personality psychology, it is not at all clear that they fit well for the types of goals, 
motivational incentives, and behaviors that are the focus of standard cognitive 
neuroscience studies.  Thus, more work will be needed to understand whether the 
concepts of mental contrasting and mindsets can be “translated” into more basic 
experimental domains. It is also thus unknown what cognitive and neural mechanisms 
underlie components of higher-order processes of mental contrasting and goal setting. 
 
How do beliefs impact motivations?  
An important, but often overlooked, area of motivation involves the study of beliefs 
and their impact.  Recent research has shown that people’s beliefs (for example, about the 
fixedness or malleability of personal attributes) predict their school achievement, the 
success of their relationships, the hardiness of their willpower, and their willingness to 
compromise for peace in the face of conflict  (see Dweck, 2012). These beliefs do so by 
changing the goals people are motivated to pursue and the ways that they pursue them.  
Moreover, the same lines of research show that changing people’s beliefs can change 
these goals and outcomes. Beliefs can change the meaning of the seemingly same 
experience, determining whether an individual views challenges as threats or 
opportunities (e.g., Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997), and setbacks as 
indicating a lack of ability or as signaling that a change in effort or strategy is called for 
(e.g., Blackwell et al., 2007; Walton & Cohen, 2007). Beliefs can change the meaning of 
effort, from something unpleasant that makes people feel less competent, to something 
positive that signals learning (Blackwell et al., 2007). These different meanings have 
profoundly different motivational consequences.  
 Yet research is only just beginning to understand the potential cognitive and neural 
mechanisms by which beliefs impact motivation.  For example, in one study, individuals 
who differed in their beliefs about intelligence showed distinct patterns of behavioral and 
neural responses to errors in a demanding cognitive task.  Specifically, individuals 
possessing a “growth mindset” (i.e., that intelligence is malleable and can be developed) 
showed higher accuracy after making an error, and this effect was mediated by a post-
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error ERP component (termed the Pe), thought to reflect error awareness and attentional 
allocation (Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010).  Thus, it is possible to interpret these results as 
suggesting that beliefs about intelligence alter: a) how task errors are interpreted by the 
brain, and b) their motivational impact on subsequent performance. Given that such 
research is only in its infancy, much additional work is needed to understand the neural 
mechanisms of belief development and change, and how such processes alter the 
landscape of motivation-cognition interactions.  
 
Are there other motivational constructs that should receive neuroscience investigation? 
In addition to the topics discussed in this paper, there are still many motivational 
constructs and phenomena that have been proposed and/or examined in psychology but 
have been paid little attention in neuroscience (Reeve & Lee, 2012). In fact, 
psychologists have proposed a number of motivational constructs to explain human 
behavior (some of them are already discussed in the paper), such as intrinsic motivation 
(Deci & Ryan, 1985), need for achievement (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 
1976), need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977), 
achievement goals (Dweck, 1986), self-enhancement motives (Sedikides & Strube, 1997), 
and self-consistency motive (Aronson, 1968), just to name a few. These topics may be an 
important avenue for future research in neuroscience. Yet they also present an important 
challenge:  Can an integrative account be developed that incorporates the myriad of 
motivational constructs proposed in psychology into the theoretical frameworks used in 
neuroscience and/or computational models?  
This is a critical question for understanding the complicated nature of motivation. 
For example, there is a long-lasting tradition in psychology to distinguish intrinsic 
interest and extrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985), and most research in psychology 
has stood on the assumption that these motivations are distinct, qualitatively different 
entities. Viewed from the reinforcement learning theory framework, however, extrinsic 
motivation and intrinsic motivation may come from a common reward-processing 
mechanism to produce motivated behavior, with extrinsic motivation being focused on 
immediate, tangible reward and intrinsic motivation being focused on invisible, future 
reward (Singh et al., 2010)(see also Daw, O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). 
Likewise, as described above, intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation seem to 
activate common striatal reward areas (Murayama et al., 2010), suggesting a common 
neural basis. As another example, a large literature in social psychology posits that a host 
of human social behavior can be interpreted in terms of a fundamental “cognitive 
consistency motive” (or a “dissonance reduction motive”): a drive to reduce 
psychologically dissonant cognitions by modifying them to be consistent (Abelson, 1968; 
Aronson, 1968; Festinger, 1957). However, many of cognitive dissonance phenomena 
were successfully simulated in a computational model in which dissonance reduction 
occurs as an emergent product of much simpler cognitive phenomena (i.e., low-level 
constraint satisfaction mechanisms; Shultz & Lepper, 1998).  Together, these examples 
suggest that neuroscience and computationally-based theories may be able to provide 
accounts of complex motivational phenomena in terms of simpler and potentially more 
unifying mechanisms. 
Motivation is invisible. Yet people are extremely talented in ascribing 
motivational concepts to interpret behavioral patterns. When we see a person acting in an 
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unusual way, we cannot help thinking “why does s/he do that?” Even infants have basic 
inclination to infer other’s intentions or motives (Woodward, 1998). Many studies have 
shown that people are good at giving post-hoc explanations (i.e., motivation) for the 
behavior that was actually induced unconsciously by extraneous factors (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). This inborn-tendency to attribute motivation to action may have 
contributed to the current myriad of definitions, hypotheses, and constructs to describe 
motivation (as discussed in this article). With the advance in the neuroscientific and 
computational approaches to motivation, the time may now be ripe to integrate these 
divergent views on motivation in a coherent, parsimonious way, instead of using 
motivation as a convenient “catch-all” to explain (or explain away) complex aspects of 
human behavior. 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 As we suggested at the outset of this article, it is indeed an exciting time for the 
study of motivation-cognition interactions.   Although studies of motivation have been an 
active focus within psychology and neuroscience for decades, there has clearly also been 
a recent rejuvenation of interest.  This rejuvenation is due, at least in part, to the growing 
body of exciting new findings occurring across a range of areas, including dissociations 
between goal-directed versus habitual motivational control, subliminal priming of goal 
pursuit, ego-depletion and related influences on the engagement of cognitive effort, age-
related positivity biases, and adolescent over-sensitivity to incentive motivation.  
Likewise, emerging insights into the mechanisms of motivation have been prompted by 
new evidence that motivation influences cognition in areas where it has been previously 
thought irrelevant, for example in long-term memory formation.   As we reviewed above, 
and as is detailed in this Special Issue, some of these findings are having a strong impact 
on, and are being impacted by, current cognitive neuroscience research.   
  Yet for all the rejuvenation, excitement, and new findings, many challenges 
remain.   We would argue that the most critical and formidable challenge is that, with few 
exceptions, research on motivation-cognition interactions has been somewhat balkanized. 
Each of the different sub-fields tends to work largely in isolation, with the questions 
being pursued and methods being utilized showing little influence from, and awareness 
of, the parallel work going on in other areas.  This balkanization has an impact even at 
the conceptual level, in terms of the definitions and dimensions that are used to 
taxonomize the domain and specify the relevant theoretical issues to be investigated.    
 Nevertheless, we believe that the time is ripe to move towards greater cross-
disciplinary interaction and integration.  A large number of pressing research questions 
are only just beginning to be addressed by current studies.  We believe that the field is 
now poised to make rapid progress on these and related questions, but that such progress 
will critically depend upon the adoption of an integrative, collaborative approach.  
Indeed, an explicit goal of this article, and the Special Issue, is to encourage researchers 
towards such an approach, by highlighting not only the challenges but also the 
opportunities that come about from greater awareness of the breadth of motivation-
cognition work occurring throughout psychology and neuroscience.  Our hope is that the 
forging of new cross-disciplinary approaches and collaborations, hopefully inspired by 
this Special Issue, will lead us towards a more unified and comprehensive account of the 
mechanisms of motivation-cognition interaction.   
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TERMINOLOGY ANIMAL 
LITERATURE 
emphasis 
SOCIAL & 
PERSONALITY 
PSYCHOLOGY 
emphasis 
REINFORCEMENT 
LEARNING 
emphasis 
HUMAN COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE 
emphasis 
Consistency, Conflict or 
Gaps in accounts 
Motivation Components: 
directional component 
orients toward goal 
state, and activation 
component invigorates 
and energizes action 
 
 
Motives: 
Expectations, 
needs and efficacy 
of the individual, 
more than 
quantifiable 
incentive values. 
Energization and 
directional 
components are 
recognized.  
  
 
 
‘Motivated’ behavior 
= action selection / 
decision-making 
driven by 
considerations of 
reward or utility; these 
are modulated by 
motivational state  
Quantification: neural 
representation of expected 
value of future events 
predicting decisions to 
invest effort  
 
Consistency
1) behavior driven by reward 
or utility; not limited to drive 
reduction  
2) Moderated by perceived 
efficacy 
3) Regulates effort investment  
 
Gap 
Individual motives usually 
neglected in the cognitive and 
animal literature, whereas 
quantification is limited in 
Social.  
Goal Internal subjective 
states that generate 
activational and 
directional 
components of 
motivation  
Mental 
representation of 
desired state, 
characterized by 
feasibility and 
desirability, 
commitment, and 
beliefs  
The implicit, constant 
goal of the organism is 
to maximize reward  
Operationalized as active 
maintenance of internal 
representations of desired 
states 
Consistency   
All postulate desired and 
predicted states that may differ 
from current state 
  
Gap 
Cognitive Neuroscience and 
animal literature emphasize 
transient goals; RL and Social 
include study of common 
stable goals; Personality focus 
on individual differences in 
goals 
Goal pursuit Learning which 
actions bring about the 
valued outcome – 
unlike habit, goal 
pursuit behavior is 
sensitive to outcome 
Distinctions 
between goal 
setting or mere 
activation of  a 
goal representation 
and goal striving  
Nested goal 
hierarchies are 
necessary framework 
for model-based 
reinforcement learning 
In some accounts 
conceptualized in terms of 
affective valence states 
Consistency  
All accounts emphasize effort  
Gap 
Not all disciplines recognize 
subprocesses  
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revaluation   
Habit Stimulus-response 
association unmoored 
from modification by 
outcomes or incentive 
salience.  
 
Goal-action links 
causing automatic 
activation of 
behavior  
May depend on prior 
model-free 
reinforcement learning  
 
Mostly considered in 
research on  
addiction, mainly 
recapitulates animal 
literature 
 
Consistency 
A highly automatized link to 
action. 
Conflict 
Social psychology concept of 
habit as goal-oriented is at 
odds with animal literature 
account of habit as goal-
independent 
Incentive value Eventually decoupled 
by learning from 
hedonic impact of 
incentives  
Not typically 
discussed except in 
terms of individual 
motives 
Defined by magnitude 
x success probability 
 
Defined by magnitude, 
valence x success 
probability 
  
Consistency 
Value includes magnitude x 
success probability 
Gap 
Computation of incentive value 
is relatively unexamined in 
terms of individual motives  
Incentive salience Dictated by learned 
incentive value and 
current state 
Not typically 
discussed but 
implied by 
emphasis on 
individual motives 
Salience concept is 
ambiguous, sometimes 
meaning 
‘associability’ rather 
than value 
Inferred from activation of 
motivational architecture 
during anticipation and 
subsequent instrumental 
behavior 
Consistency  
quantifies influence of a 
stimulus on behavior 
Gap 
Current definitions do not 
consider individual motives or 
long-term goals  
Intrinsic vs. 
extrinsic 
motivation 
Animal models have 
found this distinction 
challenging to explore  
Intrinsic motivation 
is engagement in a 
task for inherent 
satisfaction; 
extrinsic 
reinforcement may 
undermine this 
effect 
Classically no 
distinction (recent 
work includes 
information structure 
as a reinforcer) 
Most cognitive 
neuroscience work has 
focused on extrinsic 
motivation given focus on 
quantifiable reinforcement 
Consistency  
Most approaches acknowledge 
but do not manipulate this 
distinction.  
Conflict 
Tension with ideas about 
common currency of “reward” 
 
Table 1. Do we speak the same language? Disciplines of research on motivation have had substantially different foci and 
operationalization, but there are relatively few frank conflicts in terminology and usage. 
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